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ON GODEL'S  WAY  IN: THE INFLUENCE  OF RUDOLF CARNAP 
WARREN GOLDFARB 
The philosopher  Rudolf Carnap  (1891-1970), although  not himself  an 
originator  of mathematical  advances  in logic, was much  involved  in the de- 
velopment  of the subject.  He was the most important  and deepest  philoso- 
pher of the Vienna  Circle  of logical  positivists,  or, to use the label  Carnap 
later  preferred,  logical  empiricists.  It was Carnap  who gave  the most fully 
developed  and sophisticated  form to the linguistic  doctrine  of logical and 
mathematical  truth: the view that the truths  of mathematics  and logic do 
not describe  some Platonistic  realm,  but rather  are artifacts  of the way we 
establish  a language  in which  to speak  of the factual,  empirical  world,  fall- 
outs of the representational  capacity  of language.  (This  view  has its roots  in 
Wittgenstein's  Tractatus,  but  Wittgenstein's  remarks  on mathematics  beyond 
first-order  logic are notoriously  sparse  and cryptic.) Carnap  was also the 
thinker  who,  after  Russell,  most  emphasized  the  importance  of modern  logic, 
and the distinctive  advances  it enables  in the foundations  of mathematics, 
to contemporary  philosophy.  It was through  Carnap's  urgings,  abetted  by 
Hans Hahn, once Carnap  arrived  in Vienna  as Privatdozent  in philosophy 
in 1926,  that the Vienna  Circle  began  to take  logic seriously  and that posi- 
tivist  philosophy  began  to grapple  with the question  of how an account  of 
mathematics  compatible  with  empiricism  can be given  (see Goldfarb  1996). 
A particular  facet of Carnap's  influence  is not widely  appreciated:  it was 
Carnap  who introduced  Kurt  Godel to logic,  in the serious  sense.  Although 
Godel seems  to have  attended  a course  of Schlick's  on philosophy  of mathe- 
matics  in 1925-26,  his second  year  at the University,  he did not at that  time 
pursue  logic  further,  nor  did  the  seminar  leave  much  of a trace  on him. In the 
early  summer  of 1928,  however,  Carnap  gave  two  lectures  to the  Circle  which 
Godel  attended,  or so I surmise.  At these  occasions,  Carnap  presented  mate- 
rial from his manuscript  treatise, Untersuchungen  zur allgemeinen  Axiomatik, 
that  is, "Investigations  into general  axiomatics",  which  dealt  with  questions 
of consistency,  completeness  and categoricity.  Carnap  later  circulated  this 
material  to various  people  including  Godel. 
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Godel's serious interest in logic dates from that time.  Subsequently he 
began the systematic reading in logic that brought him to the frontiers of 
what was then known, as his library  request-slips  show (Dawson 1997, p. 53). 
So,  for example, in a letter to  his fellow student Herbert Feigl,  later a 
distinguished philosopher of  science in America, he reports on what he 
did with his 1928 summer vacation: 
I myself was in Briinn the whole time and among other things read 
a part of Principia  mathematica,  about which, however, I was less 
enthusiastic [begeistert]  than I had expected from its reputation. 
(letter to Feigl, 24 September 1928; Godel  2003, p. 403) 
That he was put onto Principia  is no doubt also Carnap's  influence;  Carnap's 
concern with details of Principia  far outstripped what would have been com- 
mon among mathematicians  by that time. It is, of course, a simplified  version 
of the system of Principia  that appears  in Godel's 1931 incompleteness  paper. 
Hilbert and Ackermann's  Grundziige  der theoretischen  Logik, published in 
1928, was another of the first books Godel looked at in logic. He found his 
dissertation problem in it:  the question of the completeness of first-order 
logic is explicitly formulated for the first time in the book, on p. 68. In 1975, 
the sociologist Burke Grandjean sent a questionnaire to Godel, in which he 
asked, "When  did you become interested  in the problem...  of the complete- 
ness of logic and mathematics?" and "Are  there any influences you would 
single out as especially important in this regard?" Godel's answers were: 
"1928"; and "Hilbert Ackermann: Introduction to math Logic, Carnap: 
Lectures of math Logic" (Godel  2003, p. 447). 
Now, Carnap's  logical work did not influence Godel in any mathematical 
or technical way: there is in Carnap's material no mathematical idea that 
could be exploited for serious results.  What G6del learned from Carnap 
concerned the concepts that needed to be investigated. The peculiarities of 
the way Carnap framed those concepts motivated Godel concerning both 
the problems he set himself to investigate and the correct formulation of the 
concepts. 
Carnap's  focus in the Untersuchungen  was on properties  of axiom systems 
such as consistency and completeness.'  The subtitle of the first volume of 
the manuscript, and the title of Carnap's  lectures, was Metalogik. But in fact 
Carnap's  work was not at all metalogical, in our sense. For Carnap worked 
in a Russellian tradition, that is, with a conception of logic that can be called 
"universalist"  (the term stems from van  Heijenoort  1967). All notions were  to 
be defined within  the logical system. Consider the conjunction F of axioms 
of a system (Carnap's  treatment is limited to finitely axiomatized theories). 
F contains various nonlogical vocabulary;  let us call F(R)  what we obtain 
from F  by replacing these with variables (of the appropriate  types).  Then 
'Carnap never published this manuscript;  it appeared  only recently  as Carnap  2000. In my 
account of this work in the next few paragraphs,  I draw heavily on Awodey  and Carus  2001. 
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the assertion  that the axioms  have  a model (are satisfiable)  is expressed  in 
the system  by 
(3R)F (R). 
The assertion  that  an assertion  G follows  from  the axioms  is expressed  as 
(VR)(F(R)  D  G(R)), 
that is, in the terminology  of Russell  1903, F(R)  formally  implies G(R). 
The assertion  that the axioms  are inconsistent  is then the assertion  that a 
contradiction  follows  from  them: 
(3G)(V2R)(F(R)  D G(R).-G(R)). 
The quantification  "(3G)"  is to be construed  here  not as over  formulas,  but 
rather  over  propositional  functions  (i.e.,  properties)  of a higher  order. 
Note how simple  it is to show,  once the concepts  are  defined  in this way, 
that  if the  axioms  are  consistent  then  they  have  a model. For  assume  they  do 
not have  a model:  that  is, (VR)^F(R). Then (VR)(F(R) D H) for any H, 
and in particular,  for some  H of the form  G(R).G  (R). Hence  the axioms 
are  inconsistent. 
So here  we have  a trivial  proof  of a claim  that  verbally  sounds  exactly  like 
a completeness  theorem: an axiom system  has a model if it is consistent. 
Of course, it is not really  such a theorem;  in particular  the definition  of 
consequence  that is used to frame  that of consistency  does not accord  with 
what  is ordinarily  meant  by a deductive  consequence  of the axiom  system. 
The opening of Godel's  doctoral dissertation,  completed  in July 1929, 
reacts  to this pseudo-completeness  theorem. He starts  by being  insistently 
explicit  on what  notion of consequence  is at issue  in the dissertation.  In the 
second  sentence,  he frames  his theorem  thus: every  valid formula  of first- 
order  logic  "can  be derived  from  the axioms  by means  of a finite  sequence  of 
formal  inferences."  Two  sentences  later,  after  reformulating  the theorem  as 
about  consistent  axiom  systems,  he elaborates,  "Here  'consistent'  means  that 
no contradiction  can  be derived  by  means  of finitely  many  formal  inferences" 
(G6del 1986, p. 61). 
On the next page, G6del gives  an explicit  formulation  of what Carnap's 
argument  shows,  in a way  that  makes  apparent  its difference  from  complete- 
ness. 
If we replace  the notion of logical  consequence  (that  is, of being 
formally  provable  in finitely  many  steps)  by  implication  in Russell's 
sense,  more  precisely,  by  formal implication,  where  the variables 
are  the  primitive  notions  of the axiom  system  in question,  then  the 
existence  of a model  for a consistent  axiom  system  (now  taken  to 
mean  one that  implies  no contradiction)  follows  from  the fact  that 
a false  proposition  implies  any other,  hence  also every  contradic- 
tion (whence  the assertion  follows  at once by indirect  argument). 
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[fn:]  This seems to have been noted for the first time by R. 
Carnap  in a hitherto unpublished  work, which he was kind enough 
to put at my disposal in a manuscript form. 
Of course, the subtext here is that in defining the notions as he did, Carnap 
trivialized the problem.  But on the surface, Godel is most polite in giving 
Carnap credit. 
A  more serious criticism is contained in the sentences just before this 
paragraph, although that it pertains to Carnap is disguised.  Indeed, the 
point of those sentences has seemed to many readers  to be somewhat obscure 
(in their Introductory Note to the dissertation, Gddel  1986, p. 49, Dreben 
and van Heijenoort call the remarks "somewhat  misleading"). 
But one might perhaps think that the existence of the notions 
introduced through an axiom system is to  be defined outright 
by the consistency of the axioms and that, therefore, a proof [of 
completeness] is to be rejected out of hand.  This definition ... 
however,  manifestly presupposes the axiom that every mathemati- 
cal problem is solvable. Or, more precisely,  it presupposes that we 
cannot prove the unsolvability of any problem. For, if the unsolv- 
ability of some problem (in the domain of real numbers, say) were 
proved, then, from the definition above, there would follow the 
existence of two non-isomorphic realizations of the axiom system 
for the real numbers, while on the other hand we can prove the 
isomorphism of any two realizations. We cannot at all exclude out 
of hand, however, a proof of the unsolvability of a problem if we 
observe that what is at issue here is only unsolvability by certain 
precisely stated formal means of inference.  For all the notions 
that are considered here (provable,  consistent, and so on) have an 
exact meaning only when we have precisely delimited the means 
of inference that are admitted. 
The point of these remarks  becomes clear, I think, once we understand two 
further concepts that are central in Carnap's  logical investigations, namely, 
Entscheidungsdefinitheit  and monomorphicity. The former word is usually 
translated "syntactic completeness"; but that would be inappropriate  here, 
since, in line with his universalist  view, Carnap does not define the notion in 
a metamathematical  way. Instead it is defined as 
(VG)(G is a consequence ofF  or -G  is a consequence ofF), 
where consequence is taken in Carnap's  sense, that is, as formal implication: 
(VG)[(VR)(F(R)  D G(R)) V (VR)(F(R)  D -G(R))]. 
Monomorphicity corresponds to what we call categoricity, and is defined 
roughly thus: 
(VR)  (VR')(F(R).F  (R') D R _  R'). 
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Carnap  claims to prove in his manuscript  that a theory is entscheidungsdefinit 
if and only if it is monomorphic. When Carnap's  notions are replaced with 
their modern correlates, we obtain a biconditional one direction of which 
from syntactic completeness to categoricity-is  simply false, since syntactic 
completeness yields only the elementary  equivalence of models and no more; 
and the other direction of which is nearly  true, in the first-order  case, needing 
only to be amplified by cardinality  considerations. In contrast, the direction 
from Entscheidungsdefinitheit  to monomorphicity is straightforward; this 
illustrates what it is to work inside a universalist conception. For if F is not 
monomorphic, then there are R and R' such that F(R)  and F(R'),  but R 
and R' are not isomorphic.  Consider the property of being isomorphic to 
R'; that is precisely a G for which the claim of Entscheidungsdefinitheit  will 
fail, since it is neither the case that every R such that F(R)  is isomorphic to 
R' nor is it the case that every R such that F(R)  is not isromorphic to R'. 
The point is that the quantifier (VG) in the definition of entscheidungsdefinit 
ranges over properties, with no limitation to those that are expressible in a 
fixed vocabulary of a formal theory. (In fact, Carnap takes the quantifier to 
range only over properties that respect isomorphism, that is, properties G 
such that (VR)(VS)(G(R).R  -  S D G(S)).) 
However, the direction of Carnap's claim relevant to G6del's remark is 
from monomorphicity to Entscheidungsdefinitheit.  Again, the proof is nearly 
trivial. If the axiom system F is not entscheidungsdefinit  then, for some G, 
both G and ~G  fail to be consequences of F; by Carnap's definition, this 
means that both 
(3R)(F (R).G(R)) 
and 
(3R)(F(R).G  (R)). 
Clearly these two realizations cannot be isomorphic; so the system fails to 
be monomorphic. 
Now it can be shown in the logical theory within which Carnap  works (the 
theory of types) that Peano arithmetic is monomorphic.  Hence Carnap's 
claim would imply that Peano arithmetic is entscheidungsdefinit.  A similar 
remark  would hold for the axiom system for the real numbers  to which Godel 
alludes. 
Godel's criticism is directed on the surface against those who define math- 
ematical existence in terms of consistency. Carnap does not do this; but, as 
we have seen, given his definitions existence follows from consistency in one 
trivial step. Moreover, it follows without any attention to the particularities 
of the logical system within which the notions are framed, e.g., whether they 
are first-order  or higher-order. Hence, Carnap's  procedure is little different 
from defining existence as consistency. And then G6del's point is clear: there 
may be cases in which we can prove all realizations of an axiom system are 
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isomorphic,  yet this does not settle whether  all questions  are formally  de- 
cidable  from  the axioms. Thus, Carnap's  Entscheidungsdefinitheit  does not 
capture  the notion of formal  decidability  of a problem.  That  is what  G6del 
emphasizes  in the last sentence  cited  above. 
It should be emphasized  that G6del's  argument  here is meant to be a 
general  one.  He is arguing  that it is a mistake  to identify  mathematical 
existence  and  consistency  in  general,  that  is, across  a range  of logical  systems, 
including  higher-order  ones. For if this identification  is made  in general,  it 
is made for logics in which  the categoricity  of various  axiom systems,  e.g., 
Peano  arithmetic  or the theory  of the real  numbers,  can be proved.  In those 
cases, the identification  immediately  yields  the conclusion  that one can not 
show  that  any  question  in those systems  is formally  undecidable,  because  to 
show formal  undecidability  of F is precisely  to show that both the axioms 
conjoined  with F and the axioms  conjoined  with -F  are  consistent,  which 
(by  the assumed  identification)  would  show  the  existence  of non-isomorphic 
realizations  of the axioms.2 
Of course  G6del's  remark  is also a foreshadowing  of the incompleteness 
result, which he obtained  the following  year. In fact, G6del's  first pub- 
lic announcement  of incompleteness  emphasizes  precisely  the same point. 
(Carnap  was among  the first  persons  to whom  G6del  mentioned  his result, 
in a private  conversation  on 26 August 1930. How he explained  it on that 
occasion, or in a subsequent  conversation  with Carnap  on 29 August, is 
not preserved,  but he did talk about  the method  of arithmetization.)  The 
setting  for the public  announcement  was the September  1930  Epistemology 
of the Exact Sciences  conference  in K6nigsberg,  a meeting  that brought 
together  positivistically  inclined  philosophers  and logicians  from Poland, 
Germany,  and Austria.  The main  topic of G6del's  talk (Godel  *1930c)  was 
his completeness  result.  After  presenting  it, he continued: 
I would furthermore  like to call attention  to an application  that 
can be made of what has been proved  to the general  theory of 
axiom systems. It concerns  the concepts  "entscheidungsdefinit" 
and "monomorphic". ...  One would suspect that there is a close 
connection  between  these  two concepts,  yet up to now such  a con- 
nection  has  eluded  general  formulation  ...  In  view  of the  develop- 
ments  presented  here  it can now be shown  that,  for a special  class 
of axiom  systems,  namely  those  whose  axioms  can be expressed  in 
2Thus  it is a mistake to read the passage as being primarily  concerned with first-order  logic. 
Indeed, first-order logic cannot be the brunt of the argument, because (as Godel realizes) 
his own proof of completeness shows that existence and consistency can be identified in this 
case.  Hence there cannot be any counterexample to the identification, and a fortiori, no 
counterexample arising from his argument. His point for the first-order  case is only to show 
that existence and consistency should not be identified definitionally:  it requires  real work to 
show their equivalence. And that point is argued by a consideration about logical systems 
generally,  with the counterexample coming in the higher-order  case. 
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the restricted  functional  calculus,  Entscheidungsdefinitheit  always 
follows from monomorphicity ...  If the completeness theorem 
could also be proved  for the higher  parts of logic (the extended 
functional  calculus),  then it would be shown  in complete  gener- 
ality that  Entscheidungsdefinitheit  follows  from  monomorphicity; 
and since  we know,  for example,  that the Peano axiom system  is 
monomorphic,  from  that  the solvability  of every  problem  of arith- 
metic and analysis  expressible  in Principia  mathematica  would 
follow. 
Such an extension  of the completeness  theorem  is, however, 
impossible,  as I have  recently  proved;  that  is, there  are  mathemat- 
ical problems  which, though they can be expressed  in Principia 
mathematica,  cannot  be solved  by the logical  devices  of Principia 
mathematica. (Godel 1995, pp. 26-29, translation emended) 
The reference  to Carnap  could not be clearer,  given G6del's  terminology 
and the expression  "general  theory  of axiom systems." The point now is 
that  Carnap's  attempted  theorem  can be seen  definitely  to fail, once  entschei- 
dungsdefinit  is defined  in the appropriately  metatheoretical  way,  as a direct 
consequence  of incompleteness.3 
In this  material  we  can,  I think,  see  a motivation  for  the  incompleteness  re- 
sult  that  differs  from  characterizations  Godel  gave  later  on. In the 1960s  and 
early 1970s,  Godel often commented  that  what  led him to his theorem  was 
his recognition  of a distinction  between  mathematical  truth  and  provability, 
a distinction  glossed  over  or even  denied  by both the Hilbert  school  and  the 
positivists  (or so Godel alleged).4  Nothing  in what  I have  said  goes against 
this altogether.  But the remarks  at the beginning  of the dissertation  and at 
the  end  of Godel  *1930c  suggest  more  of a concern  to underline  the  difference 
between  consequence  construed  semantically  (or  universalistically)  and  syn- 
tactic  consequence,  that is, deducibility  in a finite  number  of formal  steps. 
Thus one need not impute  back to the G6del of 1930  the full-fledged  Pla- 
tonism  of his later  years  as a motivator  for  the theorem.5  Moreover,  Godel's 
3In these remarks,  Gbdel seems unaware  that an axiom system "expressed  in the restricted 
functional calculus" (that is, expressed in first-order quantification theory) is categorical 
only in the relateively trivial case that all its models are of one finite cardinality (and are all 
isomorphic). This fact follows at once from the upward and downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorems.  Godel did know of the latter: indeed, in his dissertation he cites Skolem 1920 
and talks of "the well-known theorem named for him and Lbwenheim" (Godel 1986, p. 77). 
Hence it appears likely that at this time he did not know of the former. 
4Godel also said that he was led to the theorem by attempting to give a relative  consistency 
proof of analysis, vis-a-vis arithmetic (see G6del 2003,  p.  10).  This concern is perhaps 
reflected in his use in the dissertation of the example of the real numbers as potentially 
yielding unsolvable problems. 
5There are two other hints in his early writing that Godel was not  as full-fledgedly a 
Platonist in the early 1930s as he later became. In Godel *1933o,  a lecture given in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Godel finds problematic the use of impredicative definitions for specifying 
191 WARREN GOLDFARB 
concern to show the incompleteness of higher-order  logic provides a reason 
for his presenting the result in the 1931 paper as one about the theory of 
types, rather  than as about axiomatic theories of number  theory, formulated 
within first-order  logic, as became the common expository practice, starting 
with G6del's own Princeton lectures of 1934. 
That, then, is Carnap's influence on Godel.  After incompleteness, the 
influence goes in the other direction.  Carnap had started to recognize the 
flaws in his conceptualization in early 1930, under the urging of Tarski. His 
Untersuchungen  was abandoned by April of that year, before Godel told him 
of incompleteness.  But incompleteness, and the technique of arithmetiza- 
tion, gave him the great spur for his principal project, The Logical Syntax of 
Language, published in 1934. 
My way of thinking was influenced chiefly by the investigations 
of Hilbert and Tarski in metamathematics ...  I often talked with 
Godel about these problems. In August 1930 he explained to me 
his new method of correlating  numbers  with signs and expressions. 
Thus a theory of the forms of expressions  could be formulated  with 
the help of concepts of arithmetic. (Carnap  1963, p. 53) 
Arithmetization was important to Carnap, because the ability to frame syn- 
tax within a clearly unobjectionable arithmetical language answered the 
doubts, stemming from Wittgenstein and shared by some members of the 
Vienna Circle, that the logical structure of language could not properly be 
described at all. 
Much of Logical Syntax of Language  is a response to the challenge Carnap 
took to be posed by Godelian incompleteness.6 Incompleteness shows that 
the notion of mathematical truth cannot be captured by notions based on 
formal derivability.  Hence if mathematical truth is to  be an artifact of 
language, languages could not be determined solely by the deductive links 
they contain.  Carnap sought definitions that go beyond deductive ones, 
could be thought of as consitutive of languages, and would enable him to 
capture mathematical truth, while using only the resources he considered 
"syntactic" (a word he used in a wider sense than it currently  has).  In this 
project Godel was of technical assistance as well:  he showed Carnap his 
classes, and concludes his discussion of foundational issues by saying, "The result of the 
preceding discussion is that our axioms, if interpreted  as meaningful statements, necessarily 
presuppose a kind of Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind and which does not 
even produce the conviction that they are consistent" (Godel 1995, p. 50; cf. Feferman's 
Introductory Note, ibid., pp. 39-41).  And in a letter to Carnap of 28 November, 1932, about 
the definition of mathematical truth (in Carnap's  terminology, "analyticity")  G6del says, "I 
believe that the interest  of this definition does not lie in a clarification  of the concept 'analytic', 
since one employs in it the concepts 'arbitrary  sets', etc., which arejust as problematic"  (Godel 
2003, p. 357; my emphasis). 
6In the book, Carnap presents a detailed proof of the First Incompleteness Theorem; he 
was the first to formulate this by isolating a general Fixed Point (Diagonal) Lemma. 
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attempt to obtain mathematical truth by induction on syntactic form would 
fail for higher order quantifiers, due to impredicativity;  and he pointed him 
in the direction of the appropriate definition.  (See Godel 2003, pp. 347- 
357.)  As a result, Carnap wound up with a specification of mathematical 
truth essentially equivalent to Tarski's, at about the time Tarski was first 
publishing his own treatment.  In any case, Carnap's Logical Syntax is in 
both motivation and technique inconceivable without Godel. 
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